Financial crisis and recession
The failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15th posed the total collapse of the US financial and capitalist system. The capitalists survived that through nationalising large parts of the financial system and throwing $12 trillion dollars at the problem in the US alone. But even then they couldn’t avoid the downswing. This article considers trends in the rate of profit, how they relate to the current crisis and shows that it remains above all a crisis of the financial sector....writes Bill Jefferies...the recession that followed saw the sharpest fall in US output since 1983. The final quarter of 2008 saw GDP slump at an annual rate of 6.5%, with profits falling their fastest rate since 1953.
Financial crisis and recession
The slump in profits reveals much about the nature of this crisis and its likely duration. Marxism asserts that crisis is a result of the over accumulation of capital, that there is too much capital for the quantity of profits available or in other words the rate of profit is falling.
As the rate of profit provides both the incentive and means for capitalists to accumulate, when the rate of profit falls so accumulation contracts and crisis ensues.[1]

Source: Bureau Economic Analysis table 1.12 (authors calculations)
This graph further reveals the distinct periods or long waves of capitalist development after WWII. Profit rates were high during the post war boom, falling from the mid sixties onwards and remaining at low levels before bottoming in the recession of the early 1980s. The Reagan/Thatcher neo-liberal onslaught saw profit rates recover through the 1980s before a sharp lift off from the 1990s onwards. This is the new upward long wave of globalisation, the result of the expansion of the world market into the Stalinist states and the restoration of capitalism across them between 1989-95.
Profits and globalisation
The rate of profit underwent a secular rise three decade rise beginning in the early 1980s before peaking towards the end of 2006. Through the course of the period of globalisation, the period of the new upward long wave after the period of stagnation through the 1970s/80s it grew through the early 1990s, peaking in 1997, then falling up to 2002 with the bursting of the hi-tech bubble, before growing even more strongly up to the Q3 2006. And falling very rapidly at the end of 2008.

Source: Bureau Economic Analysis table 1.12
Movements in the rate of profit are then important indicators of the trajectory of capitalist accumulation, demonstrating the longer phases of capitalist development and the downturns and upswings of the business cycle within it.
Financial and non-financial profits
But in assessing where capitalism is likely to go next, the depth of the present crisis and whether it signals a new period of downward long wave, it is worth considering more closely the rates of profit across the different sectors, financial, non-financial, US domestic and from the rest of the world
The argument for a long wave critically rests on the idea that globalisation have enabled the US to restructure its own domestic capitalism to restore profit rates both in its domestic economy and through the growth of the financial sector and earnings from foreign investments.
In contrast the claims of the stagnation theorists rest on the assertion that non-financial profits in particular, have been stagnant throughout this period, never really recovering from their low levels of the 1970s/80s.
The stagnationist theorists, those Marxist economist who claim there has been virtually the perpetual overaccumulation of capital since the early 1970s, concentrate on non-financial profits as they believe they are least affected by the expansion of the world market through globalisation. The figures tell a different story however.

Source: Bureau Economic Analysis table 6.16
|
|
1990 Q1
|
Q1 2000
|
Q1 2002
|
2006 Q3
|
2008 Q4
|
|
Corporate profits (IVA CCA)
|
$433bn
|
$832
|
$829
|
$1713bn
|
$1254bn
|
|
Non-financial profits
|
$276
|
$498
|
$370
|
$894
|
$746
|
|
Financial
|
$84
|
$203
|
$303
|
$461
|
$122
|
|
Rest of World
|
$73
|
$131
|
$155
|
$289
|
$395
|
The mass of corporate profits rose from 1990 $433bn to 2006 $1716bn before falling to 2008 Q4 $1254. But the rise and fall of profits across the economy as a whole conceals important changes in the sectoral contributions.
Non financial profits were stagnant between 1990 and 2002 increasing just $94bn or 34%. Between 2002 and 2006 however, non-financial profits rose $524bn before falling to $746bn at the end of 2008. In spite of that fall the increase for the six years as a whole was 102%.
Financial profits rose from 1990 $84bn to 2002 $303bn and increase of 261% but financial profits then stagnated rising by only $158bn up to 2006 or 52% before falling by 73% up to Q4 2008 $122bn.
Rest of the world profits, the surplus of receipts over outgoings rose by $82bn between 1990 and 2002, before surging by another $240bn up to 2008 or 155%.
|
|
1990 to 2006q3 |
2006-Q3 to 2008 Q4 |
2008 Q3 to 2008Q4 |
|
Corporate |
295% |
-26% |
-17% |
|
Domestic |
303% |
-40% |
-24% |
|
Financial |
444% |
-73% |
-59% |
|
Non financial |
261% |
-25% |
-11% |
|
Rest of world |
255% |
52% |
5% |
Source: Bureau Economic Analysis table 6.16
In the final quarter of 2008 financial profits fell by –59% or $179bn. While non-financial profits fell by –11% or $89bn. Profits from the rest of the world actually increased by 5% or $18bn.
Proportion of total profits various sectors 1987q1 – 2008 q4.

Source: Bureau Economic Analysis table 6.16
And this is reflected in the proportions of profits generated by the various sectors. Non financial profits which accounted for just 41% of profits in 2002 have risen to 59% of profits by 2008.
Financial profits which had risen to 2002 37% of profits have fallen to 2008 10%.
Rest of the world profits have risen from 2002 22% to 2008 31%.
Why did financial profits collapse?
The dodgy lending of the sub-prime era meant that financial institutions were over dependent on open market operations to fund their debt. As lending froze from September onwards, these institutions were unable to borrow and as a result the value of their debt collapsed. Mark to market accounting introduced after the Enron accounting scandal meant that financial institutions had to value their assets at their present value. As the market for these assets had disappeared then they were written down far below the expected returns they could be expected to generate under more typical conditions. The FDIC summarised the crisis of banking profitability very well in their December quarterly report;
Expenses associated with rising loan losses and declining asset values overwhelmed revenues in the fourth quarter of 2008, producing a net loss of $32.1 billion a insured commercial banks and savings institutions. This is the first time since the fourth quarter of 1990 that the industry has posted an aggregate net loss for a quarter. The −0.94 percent quarterly return on assets (ROA) is the worst since the −1.10 percent in the second quarter of 1987. A year ago, the industry reported $575 million in profits and an ROA of 0.02 percent.
High expenses for loan-loss provisions, large write downs of goodwill and other assets, and sizable losses in trading accounts all contributed to the industry’s net loss. A few very large losses were reported during the quarter—four institutions accounted for half of the total industry loss—but earnings problems were widespread. One out of every three institutions reported a net loss in the fourth quarter. Only 36 percent of institutions reported year-over year increases in quarterly earnings, and only 33 percent reported higher quarterly ROAs.
… Loss provisions represented 50.4 percent of the industry’s net operating revenue (net interest income plus total non interest income), the highest proportion since the second quarter of 1987 when provisions absorbed 53.2 percent of net operating revenue.”
(Source: FDIC Quarterly report December 08)
While goodwill write downs are not included in the BEAs estimates of financial profits, in practice it is very difficult to separate this out of accounts, as Goldman Sachs noted;
“The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reported the sharpest quarterly decline in pretax "economic" profits since 1953. However, some of this probably reflects asset write-downs in the financial sector, which accounted for about 70% of the total decline reported. Although such write-downs are normally excluded from the GDP data, the BEA notes that quarterly reports from firms often make it difficult to extract these losses. Accordingly, we would down weight the steepness of the decline while recognizing that the economic environment was obviously not conducive to profit growth. Outside, the non financial sector, declines were pervasive but less sharp.”
Skinny on Claims and GDP -- Little Change in Initial Claims or Q4 GDP 9:02 AM Thu Mar 26 2009

And they similarly explain the falls in non-financial profits. Demand fell as capitalists saved to bolster balance sheets. Their own financial arms suffered great losses. And the availability of consumer loans evaporated overnight.
Consumption
The decline in financial profits and a reduction in capitalist rather than working class consumption is the primary reason for the fall in personal consumption expenditures in the second half of 2008. Savings rose to 4% of GDP at the beginning of 2009, while consumption fell by a similar amount. Falls in unemployment reduced working class spending power, but these were offset by wage rises as wages as a proportion of national income rose from their historic lows of 2005.
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Source: Bureau Economic Analysis table 1.12
In the final quarter of 2008 even while unemployment increased by 2 million the total value of wages only fell by $12bn annualised. To put this in perspective, the fall in petrol prices from July onwards from $147 per barrel to $47 per barrel, increased domestic demand by $280bn annualised.
Deepest recession since the Great Depression?
This recession has been compared with the 1930s Great Depression. This is pretty typical. Every recession is always compared with the Great Depression. But on this occasion the coincidences have more credence, not least because this crisis began with a spectacular stock market and financial collapse, set against the background of an already slowing economy.
Stocks - until their 23% recent rise – the strongest recovery since 1938 – had fallen 56% from their peaks in a collapse, which closely tracked that of 1929.
But the comparison is closer than simply the spectacular financial slump by a series of other metrics this recession is also very deep. Unemployment has risen at its fastest rate since 1981. Profits have fallen at their fastest rate since 1953. Industrial production is falling at its fastest rate since 1974. World trade has contracted at its fastest rate ever. And it is now worldwide, European Union, Central Europe, Russia, Latin America and Japan all face recessions. Even China was briefly dragged into the mire for two months between December and January.
The stagnation theorists worked with a view that the working class has been immiserated over the last three decades, that the world was in a “pre-revolutionary period”[2].
According to them, just as profit rates have never recovered from their 1970s nadir, neither have working class living standards. They point to the ongoing decline in wages as a proportion of national income and assert that this means that the working class is poorer now than it has ever been.
What the stagnationists ignored was the impact of globalisation in raising productivity and reducing the cost of reproduction of the working class. Although wages as a proportion of national income have fallen – significantly boosting profits – the cost of producing these wages has fallen even faster as capitalists have taken advantage of integrated global production methods. Working class living standards have risen, what the wage can actually buy has increased, even while its value has fallen.
And until its recent very sharp rises unemployment had fallen too.
This means that the working class, like the capitalists have resources that need to be exhausted before they will risk everything to fight. Indeed the US government under both Bush and Obama have raised unemployment benefit and increased its duration and reach. They have combined their bailouts of financial institutions, which in the US have now reached $11.6 trillion with expansionary Keynesian programmes.
What will determine whether this is a serious crisis is what happens next. The success or failure of the proposed reflationary schemes and the ongoing scale of the financial crisis, if the capitalists governments can spend their way out of the crisis, Obamas plan does not even start until April 2009, and the pace of financial crisis eases off, then there will be recovery of profit rates.
Profit rates where next?
Citi Bank and the Bank of America, Barclays and HSBC have all announced that they were profitable through the first two months of 2009. They have not included the level of write downs in these estimates, which is a bizarre given the role these have played in the recent past. But nonetheless it is likely that the rate of write downs will diminish after the blood letting of the autum/winter, boosting financial profits.
Around $1.2 trillion has been written down so far, estimates vary for total losses from $1.8 trillion from the IMF, to $2.3 trillion from Goldman Sachs, to $3.2 trillion from Nouriel Roubini. Take you pick, the difference between them depends on the scale of the recession and further associated financial losses, from credit cards, non-residential property, bankruptcies and so on. But whichever estimate you prefer the rate of write downs will slow from the approximately $200bn a month from September to December 2008. Goldman Sachs estimate extends up 2013. If the rate of write downs only returns to that of early to mid 2008 of around $50bn a month, then financial profits will treble.
Further, considerable fall in raw material prices has increased US domestic demand by around $360bn a year and alongside it the margins for non-financial industry. Around 40% of the cost of a manufactured commodity is raw materials and raw materials have fallen by around 60% from their summer 2008 peaks. Consumption has marginally increased in January/February 2009, while the collapse of trade and alongside it industrial production, seems to have bottomed between December 2008 and January 2009.
A recovery when it comes, and indicators do not provide any convincing evidence that it has done so yet, may be anaemic or it may be strong. In and of itself that is not decisive either. After 1980/81 recession there was a strong recovery…for 12 months. What will determine whether this is the end of an epoch, the end of the upward globalisation long wave, is whether the disproportion at the heart of the present crisis, between the production of the emerging markets and the consumption of the developed ones can be resolved. And it is just too early to say that yet.
[1] These figures are subject to revision, so the continuous drop from 2006 Q3 onwards was not initially demonstrated by the figures, hence my caution about the determining the date of the current recession. I also thought that if the present financial crisis followed the pattern of the two previous decades, the Savings and Loans crisis of 1987 and the LCTM/Latin American crisis 1998, then it would proceed the end of the business cycle by a couple of years. As we now know it coincided with it.
[2] Sometimes this meant that there was a revolution – aside from the leadership.
Sometimes it meant that there was not a revolution – as there wasn’t one.
Fri 27, March 2009 @ 16:29
discussion of this article
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