Welcome to the long wave of stagnation?
Brian Green Feb 2009
Your significant theoretical contribution to the left and therefore
your purpose for being has been your serious economic research
resulting in support for the long wave theory of economic cycles.
In particular your location of Chinese economic development within
this cycle.
Long waves since WWII
It is true that since the 2nd World War we have had long waves
of expansion and contraction all based on decisive and significant
political developments on a global scale. Our agreed tick list is
as follows: The onset of the first wave of expansion was the second
world war and the hegemonic triumph of the United States. This
lasted until 1967. After this we have 5 years of dislocation
culminating in the recession at the end of 1972. There followed 10
years of stagnation and recession up to 1982. Thereafter Reagan and
Thatcher’s assault on the post war class equilibrium, which
included their own organised working classes and intensification of
the cold war, laid the basis for a renewed period of expansion.
This was accelerated by the collapse of the USSR and the opening up
of China to imperialist exploitation (the coastal zones). Of course
the period of expansion was not unbroken and we experienced
recession in 1989 and to a lesser degree in 2001.
However in hindsight it can be seen that in 2005 the long boom had
peaked. After that what followed was a speculative orgy based on
residential and non-residential property which swept outwards from
the USA to engulf every country including China. If we subtract
from this speculative bubble after 2005 we find that
non-residential investment outside the Pacific Rim had begun to
contract.This speculative orgy, the largest in history finally
collapsed in mid-2007 and this marks the definitive end of this 25
year period of expansion.
Tangential discussion
Now I find it interesting that your article
only discusses tangentially whether or not you consider this period
of expansion to be over or not. You use an analogy of the banking
crisis of 1907 that hit the US. I do not have to tell you how
unscientific it is to explain the present by means of an analogy
which falls flat on its face at the first hurdle – for in 1907 the
US was in the ascendancy and today it is in decline.
Attention! For an organisation that staked its reputation on long
waves you need to be a lot more insightful than this. Do you really
think it damages your reputation were you to hypothesize that we
are at the end of this period of expansion. What does damage your
reputation is dogmatically sticking to a schema that the wave has
many years yet to run. If the IMF, always behind the curve, admits
that they were wrong then so can you. Interestingly the next
downward revision of the IMF will show the world economy
contracting, the first time since 1945, and that has to mean the
long boom is over.
Your article does show you were caught unprepared for the depth of
this recession. It has more to do with cut and paste, empiricism,
than a theoretical exposition of this crises. Where you do attempt
to do this you get it wrong. Let me elaborate. On page 30 you
reveal the 5th element that sustained the pyramid, the recycling of
profits from China. I have the feeling that Japanese housewives
would be sniggering at this. So would the pensions, insurance and
mutual industries (P.I.M.) in the USA. Let us consider why. At best
China can mobilise $2.5trn in foreign assets. This compares to the
$13trn Japanese housewives invested in foreign assets to avoid
earning zero interest rates in Japan. And it pales into
insignificance compared to the $23trn invested by P.I.M. both
inside and outside the USA.
Now if your were gambling folk you would have lost your socks had
you bet against the dollar and the yen in the second half of 2008.
Why, because the amount of Dollars and Yen that was repatriated
from the rest of the world was of such a magnitude that it drove up
the exchange rates of these two currencies to the point that it has
laid waste to their export industries. The previous weaknesses of
these two currencies had to do with the avalanche of capital
pouring from these countries which you seem to have missed.
China - needs 10 years
This worshipping at the alter of Chinese expansionism is
premature. China needs another ten years before it becomes a
decisive influence in the world economy as it is now in the
extractive industry phase. It may be growing fast, but it has not
accumulated sufficient capital to become a dominant player yet. If
it overcomes its political hurdles, as the US had already done by
1907 then it may, but China has a long way to go and nothing is set
in stone.
In addition, by now you have seen the rather blemished report card
on China. Many China ‘experts’ now conclude that a significant
element of China’s growth figures are fictitious. The leaders of
China may be capitalists but they have not discarded their
Stalinist habit of manipulating figures, a habit which was exposed
by their ridiculous growth figures in the final quarter of 2008
when every technical indicator spoke to contraction not an
expansion of 8%.
You have given China far too much economic independence. Let us get
the order and the connections properly arranged. What allowed China
to expand? Three factors, one political and two economic. The
political was to allow capitalist accumulation – the other two are
economic. The first was the multinationals’ need to restore
profitability by taking production offshore and in many cases away
from their markets. Secondly and more importantly was the consumer
boom in the ‘developed’ world made possible by easy and expansive
credit.
Marx and market prices
Now mark the last point. As Marx says during a period of
expansion, especially in the second half of the cycle, the
influence on market prices change. No longer are market prices
dictated by the average prices of production but by the higher,
less efficient producers. This is particularly true of the more
“labour intensive industries” which allows producers with lower
technical compositions of capital to thrive. This is the opposite
of what happens during a recession when market prices are dictated
by the lower prices of production and the less efficient (basically
the most labour intensive producers) fail.
In the case of the long boom, it was sustained not by real
investment, but asset appreciation. In turn asset appreciation fed
on credit and gave rise to new waves of credit. However even the
most inventive credit has a settlement date, and when settlement
becomes impossible credit shatters into a million pieces. One thing
is clear, the hydra heads of the state are not capable of holding
it together. We are in a new period. A large slice of demand has
been removed from the cake.
Most of the “let us stand on our head” commentators believe that it
is the banking crisis that is responsible for the lack of demand,
so all we need to do is fix the banks, get credit moving and all
will be well. In reality the banks collapsed because the
fundamentals of this demand, asset appreciation, was already
collapsing despite ever reducing interest rates. It had become
unsustainable.
And it worth dwelling on this for a moment and examine the causes
and consequences of this speculative bubble. Speculative bubbles
have two primary causes. The first is the lack of profitability in
the real economy and the second is multiplication of the credit
system. Contrary to your view of the ever-rising rate of profit in
the real economy, it is clear that the endless waves of mergers and
acquisitions combined with the conveyor belt of share buy backs in
the five years prior to 2007 showed that the areas of investment
were limited. This combined with the imbecilic policies of
neo-liberalism towards government spending on infrastructure, both
physical and social, meant that to a degree disinvestments was
taking place in the industrialised world. Rises in productivity
were not so much due to an increase in the ratio of capital to
labour as it was from repeated restructuring and the consequent
ratchetting up of the absolute rate of exploitation.
Look at it another way. Investors take risks only when non-risky
investments do not pay real returns. If we look at the level of
dividends and interest we find negative returns in the majority of
cases. This does not fit with the view of a high degree of
profitability. Admittedly deduct the 20% creamed off by senior
management and 20% by financial intermediaries (investment funds,
brokers, advisers) and you have part of the explanation, but it is
not all. Hedge funds grew, exotic (now toxic) financial instruments
grew, and there was a market for them because P.I.M. funds and
individuals could not earn an adequate return in the less risky
part of the market.
What is different about this bubble is what is not talked about.
All that is talked about is that it was all a scam. Perhaps so, but
this is not the important issue at least for us. What is unique
about this bubble was the socialisation of credit. Here we are
concerned not so much with content but social form. Marx speaks at
length about the drive by capitalism to escape the confines of
private property through the socialisation of aspects of economic
life. Nowhere is this more true than the realm of credit.
This boom has been notable for its success in socialising credit.
Off-balance sheet financing is not a device merely to make space
for more credit, it is seeking to benefit from credit while
removing legal responsibility for it. It is the socialisation of
credit, of parcelling it out to the rest of the world, of spreading
the risk until it becomes insignificant and then insuring against
the remaining risk. This is why the credit market went into
seizure, credit had become so broadly owned no one knew where the
losses lay. No one trusted anyone else because no one knew who
owned what. That is why the state had to step in. Now that it was a
case of avoiding losses rather than sharing profits, collective
ownership crumbled, and only the state which represents the
interests of all private property had any chance of untangling this
web.
Of course by any measure it went on too far. In 2005 the first
cracks had already appeared but Greenspan’s and Brown’s response,
their use of the Federal Reserve and Bank of England to reduce
interest rates and expand the money supply, re-stoked the credit
binge, deferring the final reckoning to a new and higher order. The
property boom that erupted in the USA engulfed the rest of the
world including China.
Post bubble world
Finally let us examine the post credit boom world. We are
entering a world where saving will increase, jobs will go,
investment will fall, setting off a downward spiral in demand. The
world market has changed for the foreseeable future and that marks
the definitive end of this period of expansion. We are in a phase
of capital destruction not accumulation.
So how will China cope in a world where the most efficient
producers dominate because the market price now tends towards the
lowest prices of production. Let us take the car industry. We all
know that the US producers are insolvent, but to see the worlds
largest and most efficient car producer, Toyota, fall into loss,
now that is something. Under these conditions there will be no new
entrant into the car industry. Only the most efficient will survive
and that does not coincide with late comers. China, despite its
best efforts is not a South Korea. It remains at the lower end of
the value chain and this explains the huge loss of factories which
is not reflected in the export figures yet.
China grew because it was able to integrate itself into an
expanding world economy. Your attempts to downgrade the importance
of this by looking at export value compared to GDP is interesting,
but it needs to be completed by looking at what areas contribute to
GDP. If half the population remain peasants their contribution to
GDP may reduce the portion of GDP going to exports, but this does
not mean China escapes the consequences of the world
recession.
You seek to sidestep this reality by saying the Chinese state can
engineer a turn towards the internal Chinese market and tap the
largely untapped Chinese consumer. By this you probably mean the
consumers who benefited from rising share and property prices.
Unfortunately these asset prices have tanked. Perhaps you mean the
workers in the coastal region. Unfortunately half of them are going
to lose their jobs. Or perhaps you mean the rural folk, but they
depend on the remittances of the coastal workers and they now have
to look after the returning unemployed workers.
Or finally do you mean the Chinese state can take up the slack? But
as Marxists we know that the state can only play a marginal role in
the economy. Its resources are not comparable to private capital.
Although figures suggest a marginal revival in Chinese industry,
this will not be sustained. It will be overwhelmed by losses in
areas integrated in the world economy.
Worse than 1929
Returning to the world economy, what distinguishes this period
from 1929 is this – in 1929 state resources were not exhausted by
propping up the financial industry allowing it later to
tangentially support industry. Today the states’ resources are
largely exhausted propping up the banks. They do not have much left
for the real economy except to print money. So we have a recession
comparable to 1929 in magnitude but with a different shape. Whereas
1929 was more precipitous 2007 will be more elongated. It means a
longer period of stagnation as the huge debts incurred by the state
have to be paid back. In the end there is the real prospect of the
state becoming a brake on expansion unless we have high double
digit inflation.
We are therefore in period of long term stagnation. The real
political difference between now and 1929 is the level of class
struggle and the greater ideological domination of the capitalist
class. This raises all kinds of perspectives some of them not so
good. This extended period of stagnation will force a rethinking of
the notion that there is no alternative to capitalism. Welcome to
the long wave of stagnation.
Mon 16, March 2009 @ 10:13
discussion of this article
Jacob Richter said…
Tue 17, March 2009 @ 00:48
bill j said…
Tue 17, March 2009 @ 10:27
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 17, March 2009 @ 14:32
Graham B said…
Wed 18, March 2009 @ 22:24
purple said…
Sun 22, March 2009 @ 21:48
Arthur Bough said…
Sun 22, March 2009 @ 22:16
bill j said…
Mon 23, March 2009 @ 12:43
vngelis said…
Mon 23, March 2009 @ 23:38
Dimitris said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 09:19
bill j said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 11:03
bill j said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 17:05
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 17:44
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 17:55
Graham B said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 19:40
vngelis said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 21:46
Graham B said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 22:45
vngelis said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 23:44
bill j said…
Tue 24, March 2009 @ 23:55
Arthur Bough said…
Wed 25, March 2009 @ 16:12
vngelis said…
Wed 25, March 2009 @ 23:54
bill j said…
Thu 26, March 2009 @ 15:28
Arthur Bough said…
Thu 26, March 2009 @ 21:06
vngelis said…
Thu 26, March 2009 @ 21:45
Graham B said…
Thu 26, March 2009 @ 22:58
Arthur Bough said…
Fri 27, March 2009 @ 16:08
Arthur Bough said…
Fri 27, March 2009 @ 17:54
Graham B said…
Sat 28, March 2009 @ 15:34
vngelis said…
Sat 28, March 2009 @ 20:28
Arthur Bough said…
Sun 29, March 2009 @ 18:59
Arthur Bough said…
Sun 29, March 2009 @ 22:22
vngelis said…
Mon 30, March 2009 @ 23:39
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 31, March 2009 @ 20:38
vngelis said…
Wed 01, April 2009 @ 00:11
bill j said…
Wed 01, April 2009 @ 17:59
Arthur Bough said…
Fri 03, April 2009 @ 11:12