Fixing the bathroom in a school isn’t socialism: interview with Orlando Chirino
This interview appears in the summer issue of Permananent Revolution (no9)
Orlando Chirino has become a very contentious figure in the
workers’ movement in Venezuela both for refusing to join the
government’s new party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV), and for calling for a blank vote in the constitutional
reform referendum initiated by Hugo Chávez last year. Largely
because of these positions, he was recently fired from his job at
the state oil company PDVSA, and there has been an international
solidarity campaign against his dismissal.
I spoke to Orlando Chirino on 24 March in Ciudad Guyana, in the
midst of the workers’ struggle at the steel works SIDOR. We don’t
agree with all his positions or his entire political trajectory,
but we believe he has made an important and courageous stand in
resisting the pressure by the Chávez government to place the
workers’ movement under state control. We would like to make his
views known to an international audience, in order to clear up some
misconceptions which have been spread by Chávez supporters within
Venezuela and internationally.
Comrade Chirino is currently a member of the “International
Workers’ Unity” (UIT) a Trotskyist international current centred in
Latin America based on the political heritage of Nahuel Moreno. As
is the case with most Venezuelan trade union leaders, Chirino
speaks extremely quickly and for long stretches. We have done our
best to provide an accurate and readable English translation of the
interview, but to judge Chirino’s political positions fully it is
best to read statements of his in Spanish.
Wladek Flakin, REVOLUTION,
Independent youth organisation, Berlin, May 2008
Comrade Chirino, as a leader of the workers’ movement in
Venezuela, how do you analyze the situation after the referendum
for a constitutional reform on 2 December of last
year?
In the first place, the result of the referendum was a defeat for
the government, for its new party the PSUV and for its trade union
bureaucracy. This marked the end of one period and the beginning of
another, in which President Chávez, not only in his speeches but
also in his concrete policies, has shifted further and further to
the right, making greater concessions to the bourgeoisie at the
national and international level.
Can you give some examples of this shift?
If you think about his policies in regards to the summit of Río
[with Colombian president Alvaro Uribe and Ecuadorian president
Rafael Correa], it’s evident that this was a capitulation to Uribe
and US imperialism. Also the decision to lift or make more flexible
the price controls on most basic foodstuffs was a capitulation to
the Venezuelan bourgeoisie. Chávez even made a decree which
suspended, for six months, the regulations stipulating that import
companies, in order to maintain their licences, have to respect
certain labour standards such as allowing collective contracts,
discussing with workers’ representatives, paying workers who are
victims of labour accidents etc. The regulations said if a company
didn’t comply with this, their license was to be removed so they
couldn’t import. But these have been suspended for six months. This
is the clearest expression of the shift to the right.
So the government’s latest policies mean taking back workers’
rights that had been won in the past?
Exactly. At the moment, the government is negotiating with
multinational corporations – for example with auto manufacturers –
and these negotiations are taking place without any participation
by the workers’ movement and the trade unions.
That’s why I said the shift to the right is also visible at an
international level. The most serious example is that the
government (which we’ve called anti-trade union in the past) has
put the Labour Ministry at the service of the PSUV and the trade
union bureaucracy, in order to attack and try to defeat the trade
union movement. By that I mean they attack the class-based trade
union movement which fights for autonomy and independence. More
concretely I’m referring to the C-CURA1 and also myself. As you
know, I’ve been fired from my position at PDVSA for political
reasons.
What do these attacks mean concretely?
Look at the struggle that’s underway at SIDOR. First the government
tried to impose an arbitration council on the workers. As this was
openly rejected by the workers and their trade union, the
government tried to set up a parallel union. Now, the third attempt
by the government to serve the Argentinian multinational
Ternium-SIDOR in this conflict is that the government and the
owners are trying to impose a referendum on the workers. But this
kind of democratic consultation is a question exclusively for the
workers and their trade union, not the National Electoral Council
[CEN] and the owners.
The workers and their trade union will carry out a consultation
when they believe there is any possibility of reaching an agreement
with the company. These are three pieces of evidence which show
that the government wants to destroy the workers’ struggle. They
know if the SIDOR workers win, that will force a qualitative change
in the government’s policies, because it will mean a defeat of the
unilateralism with which they try to control the workers’
movement.
How have they tried to do this?
Last year on May Day, the government, with the reserves of the
Venezuelan state, organised the May Day rally, decided on the
speakers, published the manifesto, etc, going over the heads of the
UNT completely. The year before, it had been the UNT that organised
the May Day rally. But under this Labour Minister the government is
trying, in general terms, to destroy the autonomy and independence
of the trade union movement.
And Chávez has spoken out against trade union autonomy, hasn’t
he?
That was on 24 March of last year at the meeting to launch
the PSUV. In the speech (which was crucial for us of C-CURA in our
decision not to join the PSUV) he said that trade union autonomy
was just “poison from the Fourth Republic”. This was right at the
beginning of the formation of the PSUV when the first proposals for
the new party were being made.
Losing the 2 December referendum was a defeat because more than
three million people who had voted for Chávez in the last elections
stayed at home; a part of the Venezuelan workers voted “No”, a part
voted blank, but the largest part abstained. It’s a clear rejection
of the government’s policies. What are all these policies aiming
at? In SIDOR, today is an important day – the top leadership of the
PSUV is here, as well as a commission selected by the President of
the Republic, for a secret meeting to try to negotiate a solution
between Ternium-SIDOR and the workers (and to weaken tomorrow’s
national meeting of trade union leaders for solidarity with SIDOR),
to try to impose a referendum and avoid an indefinite strike.
Is it normal in Venezuela for the National Electoral Commission
(CEN) to organize referendums within workplaces?
No, no, no. This kind of referendum is a normally question for the
trade union. The CEN is committing a serious abuse of power. All
bourgeois democratic governments in Venezuela tried to control the
trade union movement, but they did it via their trade union
bureaucracy, via their leaders in the workers’ organisations. Today
it’s the state, going over the heads of the trade unions, that is
trying to control the workers directly. The bureaucrats of the
Bolivarian Socialist Workers’ Force (FSBT)2 don’t have any
representative in the leadership of SIDOR’s trade union,
SUTISS.
It’s evident that in this period, the concrete facts about
collective contracts – not only in SIDOR but in all sectors of the
working class – show the government refusing to negotiate with
workers. They want to impose the referendum not because they think
they’re going to win, but as a means to dismantle the trade union
movement altogether.
The organised workers in SIDOR oppose the company’s proposals, but
there are also 1,800 workers from the -management level, who are
mostly technical personnel, and the company uses them as a
contingent. That’s 1,800 votes the government and the bosses are
counting on, as well as many new workers just entering the plant
who might also vote for the company’s proposal. But these people,
who would vote in the CEN referendum, have nothing to do with the
contract at SIDOR.
Is this case alone enough to talk about the government’s
“anti-worker policies”?
To give another example, since 2004 they have refused to discuss
with public sector workers about their collective contract at a
national level. The contract ran out in 2004. If you combine this
contract from 2004 with an inflation of 22.5% last year, with a
projection heading towards 30% for this year and the food
shortages, much of which has been provoked by sectors of the right,
it’s a salary that has been pushed down massively. At a time when
they won’t discuss the collective contract and there’s high
inflation, it’s obvious that there’s a lot of pressure to struggle,
and lots of people are struggling, for example blocking
streets.
I’ll give you an example – yesterday the employees of the Labour
Ministry occupied a ministry office in Caracas. What were their
demands? It’s been 17 years since their collective contract was
last discussed – that’s eight years under the Fourth Republic and
nine years under the Fifth Republic!
Weren’t you occupying the Labour Ministry last year?
That’s a different story, but I’m happy to tell it: 17 trade union
leaders who had been delegated by almost 100 trade unions of the
base went to present a proposal for a collective contract to the
Labour Minister. But he refused to accept it, even though article
51 of the constitution specifies that every functionary is obliged
to receive complaints and proposals. The 17 of us occupied the
office and they brought armed thugs [pistoleros] to drive us out.
The next day the minister went on TV to say that the workers
themselves had driven us out of his office. And we had no right to
present a response – the state TV gave us no possibility. We’re
still waiting for him to call us up to discuss the contract.
How does the workers’ movement reflect this?
At the UNT congress of 25-27 August 2006 – and this is recorded,
since we distributed the records around the world – of the 1,750
delegates at least 1,100 supported the positions of C-CURA. After
that congress the government and its trade union bureaucracy, the
FSBT, sabotaged the UNT. They left the congress and they never came
back. Since then there hasn’t been a meeting of the UNT executive –
not one meeting since May 2006.
So two years without a trade union centre?
Almost two years. I said I’m a national coordinator of the UNT, but
I can’t speak for the coordination since it doesn’t meet or make
decisions. After that, the nomination of the current Labour
Minister José Ramón Rivero, who is one of the leaders of the FSBT,
was intended to develop its anti-worker and anti-trade union
policies. -Rivero, who was a member of our party at one time33, and
his trade union tendency have consistently opposed elections within
the UNT.
The UNT was born on April 5, 2003, so it will be five years old
soon. The original coordination was named for a transitional period
of one year and then there were to be elections by the base –
universal, secret, direct elections. But the government and its
trade union bureaucracy couldn’t permit elections because
yesterday, today and I suspect also tomorrow, the C-CURA would win
them easily. So what do they do? They split the UNT, build up
parallel trade unions and they’re talking about setting up a
pro-government trade union centre.
At the congress, a big question was that of autonomy. In the first
congress, in the discussions about the declaration of principles,
they wanted to remove the part about autonomy because they said
under a socialist government it wasn’t necessary for trade unions
to be independent.
That’s what Trotsky said around 1920/21, but it’s difficult to
compare the Soviet workers’ state with the Venezuelan
state.
Clearly. And even in the 1920s, under a workers’ state, Trotsky was
mistaken!
You received a lot of attention because you called for a blank vote
in the referendum for a constitutional reform. A number of
activists from the workers’ movement, some even calling themselves
Trotskyists, accused you of helping the opposition, calling for
counter-revolution etc. Why did you call for a blank
vote?
First off, we need to go back to 3 December 2006, when the
president won the election with 63.7% of the votes. It was a fact
that the workers, peasants and popular masses of this country gave
their support to Chávez, and we supported him as well. As a
workers’ leader I was also in favor of defeating the right, which
we did. It was a smashing victory. It was the first time after the
attempted coup that the right, behind their candidate Rosales,
acknowledged Chávez’s victory. The hope of the millions of us who
voted for Chávez was that he would begin with the dismantling of
the bourgeois state, which is capitalist, which is the most
powerful obstacle against the advance towards equality, socialism,
justice, full social security, an end to exploitation, etc.
We had a clear position that this was the right time to organise a
constituent assembly – sovereign, popular and independent, you
understand. Chávez won, and 15 days later he said he was going to
make a new party, the PSUV, and present a constitutional reform to
the country. Now what did we question about the reform? The method
for working out and presenting the reform was anti-democratic and
openly caudillo-like.4 Chávez picked a commission which worked from
15 December, when he named it, until the first days of August. Only
he knew what they were doing and which articles they were planning
to reform. So that lasted . . . January, February, March, April,
May, June, July . . . more than seven months.
The commission proposed to reform 33 articles of the constitution.
Chávez threatened that if even one single comma were removed, he
would withdraw the whole project (the constitution gives him the
power to make proposals but also to withdraw them if they’re
changed). So there were only three months to review these
proposals, from August to 2 December, before the referendum took
place.
But what were the contents of the reform you objected
to?
Of the proposals that jumped out at me, at our international
current and at our team here, one example involved the question of
property: the constitutional reform didn’t just defend private
property, it added amongst the new concepts of property, the
concept of “mixed property”. In our opinion, this is a step back
from the current constitution, because in the current constitution
the country’s natural resources – in the sea, beneath the earth,
all of that – are the property of the state. But the constitutional
reform would have opened the door for multinational corporations,
via mixed property, to own up to 40% of these resources.
In fact, before the proposed reform there was an event that we
criticised enormously, which was the problem of the concessions in
the Orinoco delta. The multinational corporations there had worked
on a contractual basis. But all the multinational corporations
(with the exception of Exxon Mobil) now form part of joint ventures
with PDVSA. This means they went from being contractors to owning
40% of the project.
But wasn’t it the case that they used to control 60% of the
projects in the Orinco delta and now can only control
40%?
Well no, they used to get 60% of the profits but in terms of
property, they didn’t have anything. The rules had to be changed
because in reality they weren’t paying the state anything –
certainly their contributions were raised significantly. But our
fundamental criticism was about these joint ventures. The
constitutional reform spoke about socialism in order to give 40% of
our natural resources to multinational corporations!
Were there other proposed reforms you opposed?
And the social vision had a strong Bonapartist5
element. In regards to what was called “the geometry of power” –
indefinite re-election was introduced only for the president; there
was to be only limited re-election of governors, mayors, etc. New
municipalities and communities could be created by the president
and he would have the power to name vice-presidents to rule over
the new territories.
In practice this means if we won the governorship of the state of
Carabobo (let’s assume I became the governor of Carabobo because
that’s where I live) and implemented socialist policies from below,
the president could name a vice-president and take over all the
resources in that state. The president might say, “Well, I wouldn’t
do that to Orlando Chirino in Carabobo, only to Miguel Rosales in
the state of Zulia” but the power would still be there
There was also a horrible thing about the workers in public
administration. Article 141 of the current constitution says they
are at the service of the citizens. The reform would have changed
that to say they are at the service of public power. So if you’re a
governor and I work for your administration, I’m at your service
and not at the service of the citizens directly. If I form a union,
you have a powerful weapon to fight against that. Finally, we
looked at the question of councils: communal councils, workers’
council, farmers’ councils, students’ councils, etc.
On the international left many people see these councils as organs
of self-government for the masses or even soviet-type bodies which
will replace the bourgeois state in Venezuela.
From that point of view, we would defend the councils – we aren’t
against them. On the contrary, if the workers, farmers, women,
students etc. decide to use these councils to develop their
democracy, to intensify their struggles, to broaden their
organisations – if they use them as organs of management,
consultation, debate, representation – then it’s important to work
with them.
But what the constitutional reform proposed was a type of council
like in Cuba, i.e. councils controlled by “the Party” and its
people who are sent to the factories, councils that are
unequivocally opposed to the trade unions (and are thus in favor of
the bosses). We defended and we still defend the trade unions as
the most important instruments of workers’ struggle.
I can give 15 or 20 more examples, but that’s just three things
from the 33 articles proposed by the president. Afterwards, in the
debate in the National Assembly, 36 more articles were added, and
they were even worse.
Do these councils have the resources to act independently of the
state?
When we talk about dividing the budget in this country, 25% goes to
the governors and mayors, and 5% was to be destined to the communal
councils (that was the original proposal, they later raised it to
10%) – the other 70% is controlled by Chávez. That’s how the budget
was distributed.
The constitutional reform contained a strong element of increasing
the president’s power, without any doubt, and strikes against the
autonomy of the trade union movement. Establishing the workers’
councils in the constitution – who was that directed against?
Against the trade union movement. Because the government was
looking for a form it could use to get the trade unions to submit
to its control, but it wasn’t able to.
That should explain my position, from the point of view of the
trade union movement in Venezuela. What else do you want to know.
We presented this position to the working class vanguard, not only
here but internationally. We maintained that it was important to
discuss the content of the reform, whether it would establish
socialism or not. I know my position provoked strong reactions –
there are sectors that love me and others that hate me because I
pointed out there was not one single social improvement contained
in the reform, not one step towards socialism
The reform was presented as a vote on socialism.
You can’t tell me it’s socialism just because a hospital works. In
the developed capitalist countries hospitals work too. Therefore,
from an ideological perspective, from the point of view of
consistent Marxists, of Trotskyists, we had to oppose the reform. I
thought we had to vote “No”, but openly I submitted to the decision
of my organisation [the “International Workers’ Unity” or UIT]. An
International Executive Committee came to Venezuela to discuss the
question and we ended up deciding to call for a blank vote.
My position was that we were capable of explaining to the working
class and the vanguard that the reform didn’t have anything to do
with socialism – that a blank vote wasn’t a rejection of socialism,
and this position didn’t have anything to do with the right.
So how do you respond to accusations that by opposing Chávez in
the referendum you were supporting the
counter-revolution?
You won’t find an honest worker or workers’ leader who has any
doubts about my supposed sympathies for imperialism. In the epoch
when I was linked to the guerrilla [of the MIR], Chávez was just
entering the military academy.
The root of the problem is what kind of government is this? What is
its programme? This is an anti-worker government. When there are
meetings in Miraflores palace [the government headquarters] with
the president and the representatives of businessmen and workers,
we ask: who are these representatives, how are they selected? With
the government there’s no doubt – it was elected by popular vote.
But who are these businessmen? And above all: isn’t the government
itself picking who will represent the working class? We oppose this
kind of “tripartism”, and all forms of “social dialogue” designed
to co-opt the workers’ representatives and strangle any kind of
mobilisation based on class independence.
It’s a fact that the president has unilaterally determined the
minimum wage in Venezuela. Since the fall of the dictatorship in
1958 until now, there were always -workers’ struggles to raise the
minimum wage, to force the president and the legislative branch to
make laws. Well, these struggles have been eradicated. There are no
more discussions with the workers. The minimum wage is now whatever
Chávez says it is. There are no discussions for collective
contracts – or when there are, like right now in the oil sector,
the minister hand picks the negotiating committee which is supposed
to represent the workers. This is combined with attacks against our
tendency.
Don’t the workers benefit from the minimum wage?
The organic law of labour obliges the president to revise the
minimum wage, to sit down with the different sectors and work it
out. He has revised it, but he doesn’t consult anyone. He sent us a
letter last year to inform us of his decision, but we didn’t
respond.
What do we think? Our current wants to discuss and debate, but he
imposes measures like that. If you receive the minimum wage, you
get an increase, but people who are slightly above the minimum
don’t get anything. There have hardly been any raises beyond the
minimum wage for the last five years, which means 71% of the public
sector workers in this country are now earning the minimum wage. Of
the economically active population, more than half live off the
minimum wage.
And how much is that wage currently?
614 Strong Bolivars, which is US$280 at the official exchange
rate.
And that in a very expensive country.
Yes, super-mega-expensive [“supercarisísimo”].)
There have been rumours that you are planning to leave the UNT
and join the CTV6. What is the background to this?
We consider one of the best conquests of this revolutionary process
was its trade union central, the UNT. Why? Because it was the fruit
of a tremendous victory, the fruit of a defeat of imperialism in
the lock-out/sabotage of late 2002, early 2003. If they had won the
CTV would have been strengthened. But they lost, and the UNT was
born. The UNT was the opposite of the CTV, which was born of
political parties, especially the PCV [Peruvian Communist Party]
and the AD [Acción Democrática]. In 1958 with their deals, they
helped established the bourgeois democratic regime. These deals
included an agreement to lower the salaries of workers in public
administration and block strikes, which is the best example of
their class collaboration.
What did I say in this situation? When the debate in the UNT began,
the most bureaucratic and corrupt sectors – who today are in the
PSUV, who today are deputies or ministers – said that workers who
aren’t with Chávez can’t be part of the UNT, that trade unions who
are against the process can’t be in the UNT. In the UNT executive
committee, which included other comrades, I was the only one to
oppose this position of exclusion.
I believe the trade unions are the organs of all workers regardless
of their politics or ideology. From there, the big difference
emerges, because if the trade union is truly democratic, if it
truly wants autonomy, then we need to win all the workers who are
still confused for the fight against capitalism. If we can’t
convince them, they have the right to present their opinions at
every point in the class struggle, as we will present ours. The
trade unions aren’t political parties, they’re organisations of all
workers. Now the party we want to build up, that’s different.
Someone who believes in capitalism won’t join us.
In one year we turned the UNT into a reference point in this
country. I used to visit Miraflores as if it was my house. The old
Labour Minister elaborated many policies based on debates he had
with me. In the moment of the confrontation, i.e. of the coup and
the sabotage and all that, I was building up the Bolivarian trade
union movement, because a part of my organisation [the PST,
Socialist Workers Party] didn’t understand the dynamics of the
movement and was super-sectarian in regards to Chávez. I left that
organisation and I wasn’t active for two years. I dedicated myself
to building up the reference point. I discussed with Chávez. I was
one of the first trade union leaders Chávez listened to, along with
others of course. We told him about the history of the workers’
movement.
But what happens? The UNT is born and for the first year it
functions, but then it breaks down. Many trade union leaders coming
from COPEI and AD sign up and set up a bureaucracy close to the
government
What is the status of the CTV now?
The CTV still exists, of course as a minority trade union central,
much weakened. But I want to explain this little rumour from
aporrea.org.net [a Venezuelan left website] and other sources. I
don’t have any illusions in the leadership of the CTV. At the point
when it supported the 2002/3 strike-sabotage, this leadership
ceased to be a workers’ organisation and became a political party
executing pro-imperialist policies.
But the CTV still exists – why? It organises more than a few
workers in the education, health care and technology sectors. We
say that the Venezuelan trade union movement is in a deep crisis: a
crisis of identity, of unity, of autonomy, of everything. It’s
necessary to refound the trade union movement, to give it a
programme that’s revolutionary, socialist, based on class
independence and self-determination, with a clear position on the
foreign debt (because this country under the Chávez government pays
the debt better than under previous ones).
This is the debate we want. If you’re from the CTV and want to
participate in this debate, we accept you. You have 20 minutes to
explain your position. Those of the FSTB continue their policy of
excluding the CTV. Now that we’re the majority trade union, we can
win debates like this.
I never asked to have meetings with the CTV leadership, never. But
the other currents of the UNT have been incapable of winning the
trade unions of health care and education workers from the CTV. We
work on this, and I go to these debates because I want to win the
base. That’s the clear policy. Our position is that there should be
elections in the UNT because, as I said, it’s a great conquest of
the workers.
So you do favor a common central with unions currently organised
in the CTV?
If we win the UNT elections, our policy would be to call a big
congress of workers, with base delegates of all workers to unify
the trade union movement in a single central, with a leadership
legitimised by the workers themselves, elected directly via a
universal and secret ballot. That would be the first time in
Venezuela that we’d have a single central like that. Through
discussions by the workers as a class, we could spread
consciousness about what kind of government this is and what kind
of country we want.
At bottom, bureaucratic sectors of the UNT want to wash their
faces: they say the whole CTV is putschist etc. to distract from
the fact that their own policies are the same or worse. They’re not
connected to the ruling class via AD, rather now it’s through the
PSUV.
When I came here two weeks ago, they attacked me, saying I was
trying to destabilise the country by organising a strike at SIDOR
and things like that. I believe that the workers of SIDOR have a
right to strike and that all revolutionaries should support them,
organising a national solidarity committee to build up an
indefinite strike and stop anyone from entering the factory.
To repeat, I am very far from having any illusions about building
up a new trade union leadership in this country together with the
CTV leaders, who were putschists and seized control of the workers’
movement during the confrontation. In the trade unions, they don’t
even hold elections. Our policies are completely different from
theirs.
Moving on to the question of Chávez’s new party, in your
opinion, what is the character of the PSUV and how do you view the
possibilities for revolutionaries working inside it?
After 24 March, 2007, when the president attacked trade union
autonomy and the organisers of the PSUV attempted to carry out that
policy, from that moment I said openly and firmly that I’m opposed,
that I’m totally against the PSUV. Even back then, before it was
founded – now it has a programme and statutes – I said that it
wasn’t a revolutionary party. From the point of view of internal
democracy it wasn’t even clear how it was going to function; its
structures had absolutely nothing to do with a Leninist party. It
was profoundly anti-democratic. The process of foundation drowned
any possibility of independent and revolutionary sectors
participating.
That was your estimate a year ago. How do you balance the
experience of the PSUV after the founding congress?
The delegates were completely knocked over by the top leaders of
the government. Even though the delegates voted, the election of
the national leadership was totally un-democratic. Why? The
congress gave a list of 300 names to Chávez, and Chávez filtered
these very well and picked 69 who could be elected. This way, even
if the ones he most favoured weren’t elected, there would still be
people close to him.
For example, it was a progressive development that Diosdado
Cabello, a leader of the right wing of the Chavistas, was not
amongst the 15 principal members of the leadership, even though he
was a principal cadre of Chávez (he ended up as one of the 15
alternate members of the leadership).
The general, Müller Rojas, didn’t have such a good showing
either, did he?
Müller Rojas was up for election, but even before the election he
had already been named the first Vice-President of the party.
Chávez has the power to name the Vice-Presidents – he didn’t just
choose the 69 candidates for the leadership, from which the
congress could choose 30, he has also been given the power to name
as many Vice-Presidents as he considers necessary. He divided the
country in four regions and named a Vice-President for each
one.
Another progressive development was that none of the military
candidates ended up among the 15 principal leaders of the national
leadership. But the principal leaders, who are civilians, are
profoundly dependent on Chávez. One extreme example is the PSUV
leader Aristóbulo Istúriz – the day after election he went on
television for an interview and he said: “The people say I do what
Chávez tells me to do. He is the maximum leader. What do you want
me to do, what Mickey Mouse tells me to do?”
That’s the main problem. But another problem is to create illusions
that there’s some possibility of changing the nature of this party
– it’s not a revolutionary party, it’s a centrist party. Even the
comrades of Marea Socialista7, people like Gonzalo Gómez who won a
place as a delegate, don’t have a chance to intervene in the
debates.
Marea Socialista was present at the PSUV founding
congress?
Marea had one single delegate, Gonzalo Gómez. That was out of a
total of 1,677 delegates. As I said, the congress elected the
national leadership in an anti-democratic way, and the upcoming
election of regional leaderships will use the same method – the
battalions elect 60 candidates which they send to the national
leadership, and the national leadership picks the 15 principal and
15 alternate -members of the regional leaderships. That’s the
methodology. There is no debate, no possibility to present
documents. Right now there’s a battle going on about selecting the
candidates for the elections at the end of the year, and Chávez has
said that anyone who presents themselves as candidates too early
will be expelled.
There is no possibility there to set up a revolutionary current, a
tendency, a fraction to participate in these debates. Further, a
party that is openly connected to the government can’t be an
instrument of the working class. We are in the phase of raising the
banner for the construction of a revolutionary workers’ party in
Venezuela, which we will build up in the class struggle
For example, we are participating in the struggle of SIDOR, we are
arguing for a workers’ party. There are workers’ leaders here in
this state who in the past were Chavistas. Today they talk to you
and say that what is happening here, day by day, makes it clear
that the workers need our own party.
What are the next steps for setting up a workers’
party?
Next month we have a meeting to strengthen C-CURA and we have
decided to legalise our party in four states. That way, by next
year we can have a national party. The four states are Aragua,
Carabobo, Cojedes and Anzoátegui.
What exactly happened to C-CURA? Is the tendency divided, are
there two C-CURAs or two tendencies in the same C-CURA?
To start at the beginning, C-CURA is a tendency we found ourselves
forced to constitute on 18 February, 2006. The C-CURA was formed by
people who were members of the PRS6 but also comrades of different
organisations, it was a political and trade union organisation with
different tendencies, including members of the MVR [Movement for
the Fifth Republic] and the Tupamaros. But the fundamental cadre
were broadly Trotskyist.
By 18 May, we had managed to win a majority at the UNT congress.
That was a great triumph for C-CURA and it became the
unquestionable majority tendency in the country, with lots of
political respect. This led the government to develop a policy of
destroying C-CURA.
When does the crisis in C-CURA begin? When the president introduces
his project of reform, because sectors of C-CURA without a long
tradition of political militancy, who were more Chavistas than
Trotskyist, aligned behind Stálin Perez Borges and the Argentinean
MST and the position of supporting the Chávez constitutional reform
proposals. The people who came together in this way didn’t have a
clear programmatic identity. Their principal identification was the
constitutional reform – whoever was against the reform was against
Chávez, that’s how they saw it.
There was no decision of C-CURA to join the PSUV. There was a
meeting at which we agreed there were two political tactics. We
told the minority, “if you want to go to the PSUV, then go, we
believe it’s necessary to build up a workers’ party, and we’ll work
on that”. If we agree on political questions then we can support a
battle in the PSUV. But that’s not what happened. The comrades
openly assimilated with a policy of open capitulation to
Chavism.
We recognised that we had to let these people have their own
experience. But this relationship broke down, and the comrades
started a policy of spreading rumors in aporrea etc, saying C-CURA
had decided to join the PSUV, that I wanted to join the CTV etc.
These comrades did their part in the referendum campaign, expecting
the “yes” vote to win easily, but the result was the exact
opposite. After that, many leaders who had left us returned to
C-CURA. There was a national meeting to make a balance sheet of the
results and to discuss the policies for defending a great conquest
of the workers which the government wants to destroy.
Well, certain leaders called on us to organise a national meeting.
They came to my house with a letter, and I asked Stálin Perez
Borges to sign up to a meeting. We owe it to the members to explain
to them our positions about the constitutional reform and to
examine them in light of the results. The results were that the
right and imperialism was strengthened. The truth is that they
refused to participate in this meeting – they just published a
declaration about a “so-called meeting”. After that, they voted to
organise their current separately from C-CURA, and since then they
haven’t returned. You’ve seen they no longer use the name C-CURA.
They don’t use it anymore. They used to be “Marea Clasista y
Socialista”, now they’re just the “Marea Socialista” current. Now
we have many differences and I honestly believe they’ve given up
the struggle for a revolutionary party in this country
To me it seems impossible that a trade union leader join a party
with bosses and state ministers.
Of course. I said “I’m not going to join a party with exploiters,
military officers and fascists.” There are businessmen who violate
the rights of the workers and there are corrupt state bureaucrats
in the PSUV. Also there is no possibility for working at a
grassroots level because there’s no democracy.
The question of how to relate to Chavism – that’s where the crisis
in C-CURA came from. We never had a policy of entryism in Chavism.
In certain moments we gave critical support to the president, for
example in the last presidential elections. This was part of a
tactic to maintain a dialogue with Chavista workers. But we always
fought for workers’ political independence.
There were two big mobilisations, on 15 July 2006 and 8 February
2007, right in front of the Miraflores palace. These mobilisations
were against joint ventures. There were up to 10,000 workers
protesting and their demands included an emergency increase in
salaries and workers’ control – which meant an objective opposition
to Chavism. But unfortunately, some comrades couldn’t resist the
pressure of Chavism and gave up independent class politics.
At this moment in Venezuela, when the overwhelming majority of
the working class still has strong illusions in the Chávez
government, do you think the call for a workers’ party will have a
serious resonance?
Yes, and the problem is as follows. We are not talking about the
presidential elections. Today’s Chavismo isn’t even half of
yesterday’s Chavismo. He still has 45% support, but it used to be
over 70%. The most important thing I’m going to tell you is this –
there is a strong resistance from below, and there are strong
sympathies for leaders who fight. I’m not saying that Chávez isn’t
a popular figure – he enjoys the support of 45% while all other
political figures are around 8%, 10%, 12% . . . But the problem
today is that the polls are predicting Chavismo will lose something
like eight governorships
So it’s important that workers who are becoming disillusioned
have a left alternative, so they don’t have to switch to the
right?
Exactly. It’s important to build our party. The people who are
disillusioned with Chávez aren’t running to the opposition. This
has opened a big political space which, in our opinion, can be
filled with a great sympathy for revolutionary positions. For
example, I’m from the state of Carabobo, and Chavismo is in a
terrible crisis – the governor is constantly losing support. That’s
why we believe it’s very important to create our party and offer an
alternative for the workers.
What would you say about the class character of the Venezuelan
government? Internationally there have been many debates, some
Marxists calling it a bourgeois government – as I would – other a
workers’ and peasants’ government, a “hybrid” government or one of
indefinite class character.
Obviously it’s a bourgeois government, totally capitalist. We
characterise the government as a form of bonapartism sui generis
[of a special kind], in which the government has to mobilise the
masses, but in order to defend the class interests of the
bourgeoisie. It is ridiculous to think of this government as
revolutionary. Workers’ control of industry doesn’t exist, and even
cogestión [co-management] is under-developed. You can see the
capitalist nature of the government here in the SIDOR conflict,
where the national guard – directly under the control of the
-President – repressed the workers and destroyed 53 of their
private cars. Of course it’s a bourgeois government.
So how do you respond to the talk about the “Venezuelan
revolution”?
From a classic point of view, there’s no revolution. There have
been important conquests by the people, won via their mobilisations
– missions like “Barrio Adentro”, literacy campaigns, etc. But
these conquests don’t necessarily lead to abolishing capitalism.
Just fixing the bathrooms in a school doesn’t mean we’re living in
socialism. If you don’t advance, expropriating industry, then
corruption and bureaucracy will grow and the capitalist system will
be strengthened.
So is there a possibility of changing things by struggle from
below? The problem is that the communal councils are managed by the
state bureaucracy and the PSUV. They are organs of control, not
self-organisation. If you work for a state institution, for
example, and raise some problems in your communal council, you can
face repression from your employer and the council’s funds can be
cut. That’s how these communal councils work. But if you’re
referring to projects of workers’ councils, I can repeat what I
said before – if these projects emerge from the workers and
peasants themselves, if it’s an autonomous instrument they created,
obviously we should participate – a revolutionary party should try
to win such councils for its perspective.
What kinds of developments do you expect in the coming year?
Will there be increasing conflicts between the Chávez government
and its social base?
If the strike of SIDOR wins, there will be a political crisis in
the country. It’s not that I expect conflicts – we are in the midst
of conflicts right now. It’s everywhere – in the streets, in the
hospitals that don’t work. Just yesterday there was a strike in an
office of the Labour Ministry. The workers shut it down
spontaneously. Workers in the oil sector are watching what happens
at SIDOR, because if you remember the government imposed a
collective contract on them with very few improvements, a very bad
contract. They got a raise of 30 Strong Bolivars for the next two
years, but they had been demanding 45. The electricity plants are
involved in a huge strike right now. The government had to make
some retreats because the trade unions made lots of protests – well
they’re Chavistas but they are also class-based. They fight. The
workers in the aluminum sector are also beginning a struggle.
So you see this as a new stage in the class struggle which is
beginning?
Trade union leaders who are close to the government keep losing
support. Just look at the hatred for the Labour Minister.
So the struggle for a revolutionary workers’ party is a question
of the coming months?
I agree, but remember, we want to build the party by being the best
fighters for the workers in this country. But we can’t limit
ourselves to the trade union struggle. Two years ago, when Chavismo
was much stronger, it was much more difficult to explain to the
workers the need for a political instrument, not just for trade
union struggles, but also for political struggles. But the
experiences of SIDOR, the conditions of slavery and the repression
by the government are elevating the workers’ political
consciousness.
Why are we doing this now? One reason is that the state elections
are approaching, and in the course of the electoral struggle there
are people who want to become active. You can be the best fighter
amongst the workers, but it’s important to present them with a
political party they can support.
Thanks for all this information.
You’re welcome. I hope I could clear up, in English, those rumours
regarding me and the CTV.
Endnotes
1. C-CURA, “Class Unity Revolutionary and Autonomous Current”, was
a far left current within the UNT which at one time formed a
majority of the UNT leadership.
2. The Bolivarian Socialist Workers Force (FSBT) is a tendency
within the UNT. It played a major role in fragmenting the UNT at
its second congress in May 2006, opposing leadership elections in
the UNT leadership as a “distraction” from campaigning to re-elect
Chavez. José Ramón Rivero, a leader of the FSBT, became Labour
Minister using his position to further his trade union faction’s
position and becoming increasingly unpopular as he tried to
undermine the workers on strike at SIDOR. In the middle of April he
and the FSBT announced at a press conference that they were forming
a new trade union federation and that workers should leave the UNT.
Within days Chavez sacked Rivero and replaced him with Roberto
Manuel Hernández, a former member of the Venezuelan Communist
Party.
3. Chirino is referring to the PST (Socialist Workers Party) the
Venezuelan section of the LIT-CI, a Morenoite grouping that was
dissolved in 1999.
4. Caudillo is the Latin American term for a cult-like leader –
often but not always military.
5. Bonapartist - where a strong leader rules the country appearing
to be independent of the interests of the main social classes
whilst, in fact, ruling on behalf of the bourgeoisie.
6. The Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (CTV) was the old
bureaucratic and corrupt trade union movement, which was in the
pocket of the old governmental parties swept away by the electoral
landslide that brought Chavez to power. The CTV actively supported
first the April 2002 coup against Chavez and then the lockout
launched by the bosses at the end of 2002 to try and oust him from
power. While the CTV still exists amongst sectors of workers it has
never recovered its former influence.
7. Marea Socialista (“Socialist Tide”) is a tendency inside the
PSUV which is also part of C-CURA. Led by, amongst others, Stalin
Pérez Borges, it disagreed with the majority of C-CURA which was
against joining the Chavez party.
8. The Party of Revolution and Socialism (PRS) was a still-born
attempt to form a revolutionary organisation. It was initiated in
the second half of 2005 by many of the leaders and members of
C-CURA, including Chirino and Stalin Perez Borges, but it never
cohered as a properly founded organisation.
Thu 03, July 2008 @ 09:41
discussion of this article
Wladek said…
Thu 03, July 2008 @ 11:31
Arthur Bough said…
Thu 03, July 2008 @ 16:58
Wladek Flakin said…
Thu 03, July 2008 @ 18:38
PR webby said…
Thu 03, July 2008 @ 18:51
Arthur Bough said…
Sun 06, July 2008 @ 15:48
Wladek Flakin said…
Sun 06, July 2008 @ 20:07
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 08, July 2008 @ 13:03
Dimitris said…
Tue 15, July 2008 @ 03:25
Wladek Flakin said…
Tue 15, July 2008 @ 20:14
Anonymous said…
Wed 16, July 2008 @ 00:39
Dimitris said…
Wed 16, July 2008 @ 00:41
Wladek said…
Wed 16, July 2008 @ 15:39
Dimitris said…
Wed 16, July 2008 @ 17:49
Dimitris said…
Wed 16, July 2008 @ 17:50
Wladek Flakin said…
Fri 18, July 2008 @ 01:31
Dimitris said…
Sat 19, July 2008 @ 13:28
Arthur Bough said…
Sat 19, July 2008 @ 19:55
Arthur Bough said…
Sat 19, July 2008 @ 20:08
Arthur Bough said…
Sat 19, July 2008 @ 20:34
Arthur Bough said…
Sat 19, July 2008 @ 20:58
PR webby said…
Sun 20, July 2008 @ 11:33
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 22, July 2008 @ 16:35
Arthur Bough said…
Tue 22, July 2008 @ 16:50