Chris Harman; The Rate of Profit and the World Today: Review (Part 1)
Chris Harman writing in International Socialism Journal 115 (ISJ 115), “The Rate of Profit and the World Today ”, attempts to apply his understanding of Marx’s theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall to globalisation....write Graham Balmer and Bill Jefferies...
In particular he provides a summary of the Temporal Single System Initiative (TSSI) analysis of Marx’s value theory, as described by Andrew Kliman in his recent book “Reclaiming Marx’s Capital”, to demonstrate how in his view, the world remains locked into the period of slow growth or stagnation he described in his December 2006 article “Snapshots of the Capitalism Today and Tomorrow. ” Harman says;
“It is wrong to describe the situation as one of permanent crisis—rather it is one of recurrent economic crises. The economic recoveries of the 1980s (especially in Japan) and 1990s (in the US) were more than ‘boomlets’.”
And indeed he concludes his piece;
“Speculation about what will happen next is easy, but pointless. The general contours of the system are decipherable, but the myriad individual factors that determine how these translate into reality in the course of a few months or even years are not.”
In fact the ability of Marxism to use theory as a guide to action is not important;
“What matters is to recognise that the system has only been able to survive—and even, spasmodically, grow quite fast for the past three decades—because of its recurrent crises, the increased pressure on workers’ conditions and the vast amounts of potentially investable value that are diverted into waste. It has not been able to return to the “golden age” and it will not be able to do so in future. It may not be in permanent crisis, but it is in a phase of repeated crises from which it cannot escape, and these will necessarily be political and social as well as economic.”
Harman wants to provide consolation to whoever’s listening, that even if he doesn’t know what’s going on now, (i.e. in the next months or even years) then capitalism remains crisis ridden and indeed stagnant, just as it was in the 1970s/80s and he quotes his 1982 work;
“An overall tendency to stagnation can still be accompanied by boomlets, with small but temporary increases in employment. Each boomlet, however, only aggravates the problems of the system as a whole and results in further general stagnation, and extreme devastation for particular parts of the system.”
(Harman ISJ 115)
Speculation is of course pointless, but analysis is not and neither is the debate about the character of the current period of capitalism. Harman may have shifted his terminology from ‘permanent crisis’ to ‘repeated/recurrent crises’, but it is only a shift in emphasis, the general trend for Harman remains, capitalism continues to be trapped in the phase (however it may be described) that started with the crisis of 1973, and most importantly for him, a phase ‘from which it cannot escape’.
Has he been able to support this claim?
The Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall
The article starts with an orthodox explanation of Marx’s famous ‘tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ from Capital III, a tendency which Marx famously described as “in every respect the most important law of modern political economy”. (Marx: Grundrisse)
The reason Marx placed such emphasis on the law is that capitalism is a mode of production which produces for profit, without profits or with a declining rate of profit, the very existence of the system is called into question. But as importantly Marx showed, that this tendency for the rate of profit to fall arises through the very movements of the capitalist accumulation process itself and the attempts of individual capitalists to realise the maximum amount of profits.
Each individual capitalist will always strive to reduce the value of the commodities they produce in order to gain an advantage over his (or her) competitors producing the same commodities (i.e. within the same branch or sector of the economy). This can only be achieved by increasing the productivity of workers; the output per hour worked, the amount of use values a worker produces in a given period of labour time.
The first capitalist to introduce a technological innovation will steal a march on his competitors, because they will be able to sell their commodities at the existing average price for the sector, even though they have now been able to produce them more cheaply, i.e. at a lower value. Hence, this capitalist will gain an ‘excess’ profit compared to his competitors. Over time, the other capitalists within the sector will implement the same technology, increase the productivity of their workers and reduce the value of their output. Thus, the average price of commodities will gradually fall, finally reaching the new lower price or cost of production plus average profit, for the sector. The process will then be repeated, again and again.
This investment in more and more means of production (buildings, machinery, equipment, raw materials etc.) to drive up the productivity of labour in the above process, will, in effect, replace ‘living labour’ (workers) with ‘dead labour’ (past production). But as there is only one source of surplus value, or profit - the living labour within production, the rate of profit will tend to *fall*, because the investment in means of production will tend to grow faster than the labour employed. The capitalist accumulation process itself squeezes out the very source of its own profits – the living labour of the working class.
This process is intrinsic to capitalism; generalised commodity production, competition between ‘units of capital’ and the relentless quest to increase productivity through the application of means of production. The capitalists are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma; they can temporarily benefit as individuals from excess profits - and under the whip of competition have little choice but to do so - but the long-term consequence for the capitalist class as a whole is the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (TRPF).
This is uncontroversial for Marxists (or at least should be!), but separates them from all bourgeois schools of economics, not least because Marx identified living labour as the only source of new value (i.e. surplus value).
Marx would not have been able to establish the declining rate of profit as endogenous to capitalism without this fundamental insight.
Arguments against Marx
Harman then in a section entitled ‘The Arguments against Marx’, takes on three well known issues surrounding the TRPF. It is here that we encounter major problems with his analysis as only the last one, and then only in part (Okishio’s Theorem), can be considered as directly opposing Marx’s TRPF.
In fact the first two arguments are against Marx not his opponents. Harman’s flawed understanding of Marxist economics means he consistently attempts to down play or ignore what Marx called them countervailing tendencies to the rate of profit to fall, tendencies which can temporally impede, or even reverse, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
This is not to say, as some Marxists conclude, that the fundamental TRPF is invalid, or to place the TRPF and counter-tendencies on a par. It is only a recognition that there is a dynamic interaction between the TRPF and a number of potential counteracting economic trends, and at *specific* points in the history of capitalism these countervailing tendencies can be very significant.
The first argument Harman addresses is:
“….. there need not be any reason for new investment to take a ‘capital intensive’ rather than a ‘labour intensive’ form. If there is unused labour available in the system, there seems no reason why capitalists should invest in machines rather than labour.”
Harman replies that;
“Capitalists are driven to seek innovations in technologies that keep them ahead of their rivals. Some such innovations may be available using techniques that are not capital intensive. But there will be others that require more means of production—and the successful capitalist will be the one whose investments provide access to both sorts of innovation.”
Which really doesn’t answer the point at all. The reason capitalists will usually invest in machines even if labour is available, is because it will raise productivity faster than simply increasing the amount of labour employed. In other words the capitalist will be able to produce more output at a lower cost, as each piece of output encorporates less socially necessary labour. Although as the rise of hand wash car wash facilities in recent years has shown, this isn’t always the case!
But notwithstanding the weakness of Harman’s theoretical reply, he goes onto assert that it is any case empirically true;
“….. the net stock of capital per person employed in the US grew at 2 to 3 percent a year from 1948 to 1973. In China today much of the investment is ‘capital intensive’, with the employed workforce only growing at about 1 percent a year, despite the vast pools of rural labour.”
He uses this 34 year old example to assert that because the organic composition of capital rose through the course of the post war long boom then it must be happening now.
But are there occasions when investment in constant capital may actually offset the rise in the OCC?
The OCC may well still be on a long-term upward trend in the US, (although at other points Harman makes much of the decline in the rate of fixed investment there – while at the same time the size of the working class has significantly increased through immigration and the rising proportion of women workers in the total work force) but even if Harman is right about the USA then he is still wrong about China.
Capital investment as a proportion of GDP is at a high level in China (around 40%), but Harman’s figure of 1% per annum growth in the size of the workforce is too small, in fact it is a gross underestimate. The urban population of China grew from 1989 295 million to 2005 562 million. Between 2000-2005, 103 million people moved from the land to the cities, an increase of around 21 million a year, with an average percentage increase between 1989-2005 of 4.1% a year.
(Source: Asian Development Banks Statistics Handbook 2006)
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2006/xls/PRC.xls
There may well be gleaming new factories, some of them hi-tech, but there are also millions of new workers. And consequently, the OCC is much lower in China than in the US. Harman may be right when he says that labour-saving investments will predominate over capital-saving ones, particularly in highly developed capitalist economies. But, there can be occasions when capitalism can extend its reach into new areas. Through foreign trade, which has exploded alongside globalisation, doubling or trebling as a proportion of GDP, capitalism is able to take advantage of those nations with a lower organic composition of capital to reduce the general rate. This tends to increase the rate of profit, as Marx explained;
“Since foreign trade partly cheapens the elements of constant capital, and partly the necessities of life for which the variable capital is exchanged, it tends to raise the rate of profit by increasing the rate of surplus-value and lowering the value of constant capital.”
(Source: Marx Capital Volume III Chapter 14 Counter acting influences)
And through the super exploitation of the poorer developing and emerging nations;
“Capitals invested in foreign trade can yield a higher rate of profit, because, in the first place, there is competition with commodities produced in other countries with inferior production facilities, so that the more advanced country sells its goods above their value even though cheaper than the competing countries.”
(Source: Marx Capital Volume III Chapter 14 Counter acting influences)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch14.htm
There is a similar development in the present period, but with new locations of production. These new areas for investment are often more labour-intensive with a large supply of cheap labour, at least in the early stages. This is what is happening in China today. It is not whether individual investments are capital-saving or labour-saving for existing firms, but the extension of capitalist market and the impact it has had on the average OCC on a *world scale*. This is one of the countervailing tendencies to the TRPF that has been operating within contemporary capitalism. As Marx noted;
“The favoured country recovers more labour in exchange for less labour, although this difference, this excess is pocketed, as in any exchange between labour and capital, by a certain class. Since the rate of profit is higher, therefore, because it is generally higher in a colonial country, it may, provided natural conditions are favourable, go hand in hand with low commodity-prices.”
(Source: Marx Capital Volume III Chapter 14 Counter acting influences)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch14.htm
Lenin made the same point in Imperialism:
“As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilised….for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap.”
(Source: Lenin Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism Chapter 4 The Export of Capital)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch04.htm#v22zz99h-240-GUESS
Mainstream economists call it the capital-labour ratio, and they are in no doubt that it has fallen since the mid-90s and contributed to a surge in profitability. And it is not only due to the rapid industrialisation of capitalist China over the last 15 years, but also the millions of workers suddenly made available to capitalism with the collapse of the Stalinist economies in the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1989-91.
“The entry of China, India and the former Soviet Union into market capitalism has, in effect, doubled the world supply of workers, from 1.5 billion to 3 billion. These new entrants brought little capital with them, so the global capital-labour ratio dropped sharply. According to economic theory, this should reduce the relative price of labour and raise the global return to capital - which is exactly what has happened.”
(The Economist, 14 September 2006)
As Richard Freeman of Harvard University has noted;
“I estimate that the entry of China, India and the former Soviet bloc into the global economy cut the global capital/labour ratio to 55-60% what it otherwise would have been.”
(Richard Freeman, Harvard University, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=8617)
It is difficult to believe that a doubling in size of the world working class, over such a short timescale, will not have a profound impact on the average OCC. Harman does not seem to recognise this factor, or its consequences for the average rate of profit. A problem which is exacerbated by his state capitalist theory, which regarded these former centrally planned economies as already capitalist when capitalism was restored between 1989-91. Richard Freeman on the other hand has no such doubts;
“These new entrants to the global economy brought little capital with them. Either because they were poor or because the capital they had was of little economic value. A decline in the global capital/labour ratio shifts the balance of power in markets away from wages paid to workers and toward capital, as more workers compete for working with that capital.”
The transformation of the means of production of these states into fixed capital is a massive enduring subsidy to world capitalism as it cost the capitalists nothing but had already been produced by the planned economies of the former Stalinist states. As the World Bank noted these states “do not have the tradition of paying dividends.”
The rate of surplus value
Harman’s second point is:
“….. increased productivity reduces the cost of providing workers with their existing living standards (‘the value of their labour power’). The capitalists can therefore maintain their rate of profit by taking a bigger share of the value created.”
By increasing the rate of surplus value the capitalists are also able to offset the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. And there is no question that under globalisation the rate of surplus value has soared. Productivity has increased qualitatively reducing the cost of the basket of goods which go together to make up the workers wage. In addition as a result of the defeats of the working class in the imperial heartlands in the 1970s/80s wages fell or stagnated. In the former Stalinist states the collapse in living standards was even more severe. Life expectancy fell by 10 years in Russia. Further through privatising state assets, such as in China, this sharply reduced the cost of the wage, in Shanghai for example, after nationalised housing was given away or sold at very low prices, even in 2007 50% of households do not have mortgages.
This surge in surplus value is testified to by the huge increase in income inequality across the world, the rich have got much richer while wages have stagnated or fallen. Rather than this being a problem for capitalism it is proof of the restoration of profit rates across the world. Harman nonetheless emphasises the limits to this countervailing tendency:
“If workers’ laboured for four hours a day to cover the costs of keeping themselves alive, that could be cut by an hour to three hours a day. But it could not be cut by five hours to minus one hour a day. By contrast, there was no limit to the transformation of workers’ past labour into ever greater accumulations of the means of production. ….. Another way to put the argument is to see what happens with a hypothetical ‘maximum rate of exploitation’, when the workers labour for nothing. It can be shown that eventually even this is not enough to stop a fall in the ratio of profit to investment.”
Leaving aside the theoretical limit of zero (or minus one) hours worked, on Harman’s example, a cut in paid labour time from 4 to 3 hours would result in the RSV increasing by 67% (assuming an 8 hour day), hardly insignificant.
But, as Harman implies, productivity is two-sided, it may well lead to a rise in the RSV, but it will also tend to generate a corresponding rise in the OCC. Harman’s point is that there are limits to the former but not the latter.
This is true, but it does not follow that a rise in the RSV can *never*, under any circumstances, compensate for the rise in OCC.
Also, caution is needed when considering any rise in the OCC, because it is based on value. As Marx pointed out, the rise in the *value* of the means of production per worker may not be as dramatic as the rise in the *physical* means of production per worker.
“In short, the same development which increases the mass of the constant capital in relation to the variable reduces the value of its elements as a result of the increased productivity of labour…”
(Source: Marx Capital Volume III Chapter 14 Counter acting influences)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch14.htm
This shift has been consolidated in the advanced imperialist nations with the growth of the service sector, with in general a much lower organic composition of capital than the manufacturing production they replaced, for example, it is well known that services are more labour intensive than manufacturing (it is difficult to mechanise the cutting of hair).
Harman doesn't mention another prime candidate for the generalisation of technical progress either, the IT revolution - computerisation followed by the Internet - that has developed over the last two decades. It is undeniable that there has been massive investment in IT in virtually all sectors and developed countries (albeit uneven). This is not about changes to the work culture etc, but that IT has become ubiquitous in firms for one reason only, because it contributes to increased productivity.
“Hardware and software capital in UK firms increases productivity right across manufacturing and service industries, after taking account of other factors. In addition to the effect of investment, the use of computers, communications and e-commerce also has a positive association with productivity across UK industry. Manufacturing companies in the UK achieve an extra 2.2 per cent in productivity for each additional 10 per cent of employees using computers. In newer firms, this extra productivity effect rises to 4.4 per cent.”
(ONS, 5 October 2005, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1240)
IT hardware and software is no different, in value terms, to previous innovations in machinery and equipment (e.g. electric motor and electronic automation) that have significantly boosted productivity throughout the world economy, and increased relative surplus value for a period of time.
The Okishio Theorem
Harman’s “...final objection is ‘Okishio’s theorem’.”
But Harman’s reply confuses a polemic against the Okishio theorem with genuine counter-veiling tendencies to the rate of profit to fall. Changes in technique alone, the Okishio theorem claimed, cannot produce a fall in the rate of profit, since capitalists will only introduce a new technique if it raises their profits. But a rise in the profit rate of one capitalist must raise the average profit of the whole capitalist class. Or, as Ian Steedman put it, “The forces of competition will lead to that selection of production methods industry by industry which generates the highest possible uniform rate of profit through the economy”. The conclusion drawn from this is that the only things that can reduce profit rates are increased real wages or intensified international competition.”
In other words, if real wages are constant, any technical innovation will *increase* the average rate of profit, because capitalists will ‘choose’ to implement only the beneficial ones. This is clearly an attack on Marx’s TRPF, and Harman is quite right in his objection; individual capitalists are not in a position to ‘choose’, because they face competition within their sector of the economy that compels them to implement ‘any’ technology that will provide short-term ‘excess profits’. The long-term consequences for the average rate of profit across the economy is not within their control. It’s back to the prisoner’s dilemma. There cannot be any planning in a (pure) capitalist economy.
The devaluation of constant capital and the rate of profit
This is fine, but Harman then continues :
“Okishio and his followers use the counter-argument that any rise in productivity as a result of using more means of production will cause a fall in the price of its output, so reducing prices throughout the economy - and thereby the cost of paying for the means of production. This cheapening of investment will, they claim, raise the rate of profit.”
Here is another potential countervailing tendency to the TRPF; the cheapening of the means of production, and consequent fall in OCC. But again, Harman wants to deny the possibility:
“It rests upon a sequence of logical steps which you cannot take in the real world. Investment in a process of production takes place at one point in time. The cheapening of further investment as a result of improved production techniques occurs at a later point in time.”
And:
“Capitalist investment involves using the same fixed constant capital (machinery and buildings) for several cycles of production. The fact that undertaking investment would cost less after the second, third or fourth round of production does not alter the cost of undertaking it before the first round.”
This has got nothing to do with the Okishio Theorem, but is an argument against Marx. The cheapening of the means of production through revolutions in productivity can absolutely offset the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and indeed raise profit rates. As Marx noted;
“It is the development of the productive power of labor in its exterior department, in that department which supplies it with means of production, which relatively lowers the value of the constant capital employed by the capitalist and consequently raises the rate of profit.”
(Source: Marx Capital Volume III chapter 5)
http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Marx/mrxCpC5.html
Capitalists do not produce their own means of production, or in Harman’s example builders don’t make their own bricks. They buy them from other capitalists – brick manufacturers. If these other capitalists have, as a result of a revolution in productivity, been able to reduce their prices then this will raise the rate of profit for the capitalist class as a whole by cheapening the cost of constant capital – and indeed almost simultaneously. The builder doesn’t have to wait until he finishes the house before he buys the cheaper bricks.
It is true that an individual capitalist must accept a depreciation cost if he is still using ‘old’ technology compared to his competitors, and that this will reduce his rate of profit. But, from the moment he introduces the ‘new’ cheaper technology, his profit rate will rise. As Kliman notes;
“As Marx (1991a: 342-43) recognized, the cheapening of means of production does reduce the capital value advanced and thus it tends to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. My point is simply that it cannot do so retroactively.…When declining prices cause the value of fixed assets to fall, a company cannot simply declare that it invested less to acquire those assets than it actually invested. The size of its investment can only be reduced by taking a loss or by increasing the company’s depreciation expense, both of which lower its rate of profit. Here again, it is only the rate of profit of subsequent years, not the current year’s rate, which tends to rise as a result of the cheapening of mans of production."
(Source: Andrew Kliman: Reclaiming Capital p 123)
Harman seems to be describing an individual capitalist, or capitalists all investing at the same moment in time, but in reality there will be considerable overlap in the cycles of investment taken by capitalists. Hence, what we really need to consider is the average cost for the means of production within the sector - and whether it can decline over time.
And the answer must be yes, because of productivity growth in the sector producing the means of production. This tendency, the cheapening of constant capital inputs, will be in conflict with the more fundamental rise in the OCC.
The extent to which it can operate as a countervailing tendency to the TRPF will be dependent on the strength of the growth in productivity.
“The characteristic feature of these kind of economies in the constant capital due to the progressive development of industry is that the rise in the rate of profit in one line of industry is the result of the increase of the productive power of labor in another.”
(Source: Marx Capital Volume III chapter 5)
Earlier in the article Harman adds:
“So today we can see a continual fall in the price of goods such as computers or DVD players produced in industries where new technologies are causing productivity to rise fastest.”
Yes, but Harman has forgotten that such digital machines are not only consumables, they also form part of the means of production bought by capitalists!
Conclusion
Harman claims that nothing has really changed about world capitalism with globalisation. For Harman capitalism remains locked in the stagnation phase of the 1970s/80s, and he proves it by using figures which are between 34 and 7 years old. At the level of an empirical analysis this is hardly convincing. And it’s not surprising that he so decisively hedges his bets and refuses to make any predictions for the next months or years.
But in addition to the empirical weakness lies a methodological failure to seriously integrate the dynamic tension between the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the counter veiling elements which offset it.
(In further articles we will address these methodological errors in more detail.)
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Footnotes:
1. Some terminology:
Marx called the ratio of technology to workers, the technical composition of capital (TCC). This is related although not identical to the ‘organic composition of capital’ (OCC). The OCC is the value composition of capital. The ratio of the value of constant capital (fixed and circulating capital i.e. buildings, machinery and raw materials) to variable capital (labour power).
Marx uses the example of a machine made from steel and a machine made from copper – copper is more expensive than steel, so although the technical composition of capital (the number of machines to workers) may be identical, the value composition or organic composition of capital will be different (the price of machines to workers).
As explained above, the OCC will tend to rise as the technical composition of capital increases – but critically not always.
The ratio of profit to workers, Marx called the ‘rate of surplus value’ (RSV). Formally, the RSV is the ratio of surplus value to variable capital (labour power). This is important as for Marx only the exploitation of the working class in production can create new exchange value. Hence the rate of surplus value s/v is also known as the rate of exploitation. This is different from the rate of profit, the rate of profit is the amount of profit proportionate to the entire capital advance s/(c+v).
c = constant capital (buildings, machinery and raw materials)
v = variable capital (wages)
s = surplus value (the total amount of surplus value = the total amount of profit but profit is measured relative to the entire capital advanced, surplus value relative only to the variable capital advanced)
occ = c / v (the organic composition of capital)
rsv = s / v (rate of surplus value)
Rate of profit, rop = s / (c + v) = rsv / (occ + 1)
It should be possible to establish the direction, and possibly the pace, of movement of the OCC and RSV as capitalism develops in any given period. This is essential when discussing the theoretical aspects of the rate of profit within contemporary capitalism, but Harman’s rather brief study falls short.
2. Briefly the Okishio theorem stated that as a capitalist will only introduce a new method of production if it causes their profits to rise, then the introduction of any new method of production will also cause general profit rates to rise. But he did so because he assumed that prices of commodities (inputs and outputs) would not change between the beginning of the production process and its end – an idea called simultaneity. This was necessary in order that Okishio could apply the simultaneous equations of neo-classical economics to Marxist categories. Okishio asserted that if something cost a certain price at the beginning of the process of production, then if productivity rose, if the capitalist could produce more of the item with the same amount of inputs then profits would also rise – but not only for the individual capitalist but across the board.
The problem is that such an economy would mean that competition did not exist, as a capitalist would have to know the price at which they could sell their output before they had produced it. Whereas in the real world of capitalist production, they can never know what price they may achieve, as capitalist is by definition unplanned and chaotic. In fact as the rivals of the first capitalist introduced the same means of production, as we have already shown the price of the output would fall until the new cheaper price of production was attained.
As Kliman explains;
“The crux of the (Okishio) theorem is that, because labor-saving technological change boosts productivity, it causes the rate of profit to rise, not fall as Marx claimed…..”
At this point Harman is no doubt doing cart-wheels round his living room, but if we read the rest of the paragraph we see that far from vindicating Harman’s rejection of the effect of devaluations in constant capital, it refutes it;
“Once again however, this result hold true only if input prices happen to equal output prices. Okishio does not prove that they will be equal.”
Andrew Kliman Reclaiming Capital p 44
When Marx explains that labour saving technology boosts productivity so offsetting the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and possibly even causing the rate of profit to rise. His explanation is predicated on the fact that as less labour time is required to produce the same quantity of use values, then prices will fall, this will reduce the organic composition of capital and so raise the rate of profit. The diametric opposite of the Okishio theorem, which is predicated on the equality of input and output prices and their simultaneous determination.
Fri 13, July 2007 @ 21:54
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